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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD WEBSTER, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
MARY LEHMER AND CHARLES LEHMER, ] 
Defendant-Appellants. ] 
Appeal No. 19339 
REPLY OF PLAINTIFF 
TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court has asked us to respond to Mary Lehmerfs highly 
emotional pro se petition for rehearing which reargues the case 
from beginning to end with inappropriate first person testimony 
and references to matters outside the record of this appeal. It 
is difficult to know where to begin a response to this extraordinary 
document except to remind this court that there was a full trial in 
this case in which the Trial Judge fully heard the testimony of 
Ms. Lehmer and many other witnesses and found against her while 
issuing detailed findings of fact from the bench at the conclusion 
of the trial. In addition, despite Ms. Lehmer!s references to it as 
a letter "begging permission" for Floyd Webster to return the Lehmer!s 
cash advance and rescind the contract, my letter of February 24, 1981, 
(Exhibit 23-D) gave her the full opportunity to avoid what she now 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
now claims is the disgrace this case has brought upon her. If the 
transaction had not been so financially valuable to her at the time, 
as she now claims it was not, then it is hard to see why she would 
not have let "poor Floyd" rescind the purchase. After all, it was 
his own welfare that she now claims as a significant motivation for 
the purchase. 
Moreover, Ms. Lehmer chose to appeal the decision of the trial 
court and retained eminent counsel who extensively briefed and argued 
her position in this Court. Now, six and one half years after 
rejecting the solution to this case offered by my letter of February 
1981 and after detailed decision by this Court rejecting the claims 
of her counsel, Ms. Lehmer appears pro se to reargue the case. But 
Mary Lehmer, like other adults in our society, should be held 
accountable for her wilfull and deliberate actions and as troubling 
as this Court's decision and opinion in this case may be to her it 
clearly was avoidable by her and could have been avoided. She had 
every opportunity to rescind or adjust this purchase from the time 
of my letter on February 24, 1981, onward and the decision below 
was forseeable from the outset. Nonetheless, Ms. Lehmer wilfully 
chose to go to trial and after receiving a decision against her 
supported by detailed findings of fact she deliberately chose to 
retain the distinguished law firm to take an appeal to this Court. 
Ms. Lehmer chose to have the decision below fully briefed and 
argued in this Court and to delay execution of Floyd Webster's 
judgment for four (4) and one half years. The decision and opinion 
of this Court was clearly forseeable in light of the circumstances 
2 
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and the findings of the trial court and it just will not do for 
her now to regret those decisions and throw herself on the mercy 
of the Court. The opinion of this Court of which she complains is 
the consequence of her actions and, regrettable as it may be, she 
must be held fully accountable for them in the circumstances. 
Nor is it proper for her now in her anger and regret to lash 
out at the trial judge and accuse him of deciding the case below on 
matters outside the record and improperly accuse him of bias because 
of his supposed emotional preference for Floyd Webster. (Petition 
for Rehearing 2, 30). This is regrettable conduct on the part of 
an officer of this Court. Though she may be emotionally upset, it 
nonetheless is clear that Mary Lehmer puts the blame for the 
consequences of her actions on everyone except herself. 
SCANDALOUS MATTERS 
(Rule 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures, violation) 
Not only does Ms. Lehmer lash out at the trial judge, but also 
at one of the opposing counsel calling him "bizarre." She then 
attacks plaintiff, Floyd Webster, referring to him as "this wife 
beater" and later stating, "As for being emotionally disturbed over 
the death of his wife: it was common knowledge he used Alice for a 
punching bag." (Petition for Rehearing 10, 32). She goes on, "He 
couldn't have been suffering too much - depression on October 7, 1980, 
over Alicefs death five years ago or he wouldn't have been in Mrs. 
Dudley's bed...." (Petition for Rehearing 39). But even this is not 
enough. Resenting the Nymans who befriended Floyd Webster and 
financially helped him reclaim his home (T. 1, 37), Ms. Lehmer pens 
this scandalous assertion: 
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"When the Nymans took him into their home.., 
and ensconced him in their midst and provided 
for him in their midst and provided for him as 
a member of the family (Fred died that August 
and Floyd has shacked up with Arlene, who 
provides for him, ever since....)11 
(Mary Lehmerfs Petition for Rehearing 30-31). 
She also belittles the work and services that she so freely utilized. 
(P.F.R. 28). 
These and other slanderous remarks are the conclusions of she 
whose hand penned the Preface to the Petition for Rehearing, writing, 
"Steal my purse, you steal my gold. But steal my name, you steal 
everything." 
There is no competent evidence in the Transcript or any deposition 
to support such conclusions. Those remarks in her Petition are not 
professional or fair. They are akin to the bargain that resulted in 
the trial court finding that, "The property had a potential fair 
market value at the time of the transactions to the plaintiff and 
his daughters of $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 which was contracted 
away for the sum of $5000.00...." (Finding #9). 
Appellate courts deal with the evidence that is introduced at 
trial and so does the trier of fact. If Ms. Lehmer had wanted to 
try her case in the above manner, she should have. We would then 
have had the opportunity to cross-examine and rebut. 
The record speaks of Floyd. He was well-known in Park City and 
his reputation for truth and veracity was "very good." 'T. 334). 
This from Ms. Lehmer!s witness. Evidently the trial judge was also 
impressed with Mr. Webster's candor. His discerning eyes and ears 
beheld a different man and perceived the circumstances different 
than did Mary Lehmer. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS :: 
Ms. Lehmer claims a concern for Floyd Webster: 
"That was part of our decision, our plan, our 
proposal. It was to see that he had a roof 
over his head as long as he wanted it, was 
that to have a roof over his head as long as 
he would like it." (T. 258). 
"We discussed buying his squatter's rights for 
$5000.00 to make life more comfortable for him 
while we guaranteed him a roof over his head." 
(Petition for Rehearing 3). 
again, 
"Our concern for the welfare of one when we 
found ourselves in a position to help, have 
all come to haunt me...." (Petition for 
Rehearing 40). 
If all this were true, why did she not accept the quiet request 
of my letter of February 24, 1981? (Ex. 23-D, see appendix for a 
copy of said letter). 
PETITION FOR REHEARING IMPROPERLY REFERS TO 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY THAT WAS NOT INTRODUCED AT TRIAL 
In her Petition for Rehearing Mary Lehmer quotes extensively 
from her pretrial depositions and those of Floyd Webster. This 
is manifestly improper. It is hornbook law and well understood in 
practice among trial lawyers that depositions are to be used at 
trial only as stated in Rule 32 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. 
That is what the section is for. Mary Lehmer seems to think that 
because all of the depositions in the case were "published" they 
are all in evidence at the trial. But this would be contrary to 
5 
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Rule 32 which does not authorize such a procedure for admission 
of deposition testimony. For example, under Rule 32(a)(2) the 
deposition of a party may be used by another party for any purpose 
but this would not permit Ms. Lehmer to use her own depositions. 
Nor would it permit her to use Floyd Websters except to the extent 
it was actually used at trial. Though she may use his deposition 
for any purpose at trial, it still has to be "used" at trial. 
Without such "use11 opposing counsel cannot know what evidence he 
should place before the court to rebut or clarify. 
She had distinguished and able trial counsel and the record 
on appeal from that trial consists only of the record of that trial. 
Such record does not include pretrial depositions that were not 
utilized as evidence at the trial and thereby "used" at trial. 
The reference to "published11 by counsel and the court below refers 
to the unsealing and lodging of the depositions. It does not mean, 
as it cannot mean, that despite many days of trial testimony and 
evidence the court considered all of the pretrial depositions in 
reaching its decision rather than just those minor portions of them 
that were actually used at trial. The trial judge clearly did not 
do so, nor could he have without a stipulation of counsel. For one 
thing, he would not have had time to do so between the end of trial 
and his immediate pronouncement of decision complete with detailed 
findings of fact. Accordingly, Mary Lehmer is precluded from basing 
her arguments to this court on sucu deposition testimony just as 
surely as she is precluded from relying on her first person testimony 
in the Petition—testimony that is not given under oath and is 
unreferenced to the trial record below. 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING RAISES NO NEW MATTER. 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED, 
MODIFIED OR AMENDED AND THE PETITION SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
Anger is not a substitute for evidence. Nor is regret. There 
is no new matter raised in the Petition for Rehearing that has not 
already been extensively briefed, argued and considered. Mary 
Lehmerfs argument regarding the value of the fee is a good example. 
This point was in contention in the trial court and constituted a 
principal argument by her counsel on appeal. And her presentation 
now at pp. 24-25 adds nothing to that argument. To allow Mary Lehmer 
to now attack the telling admission of her own expert witness at trial 
regarding the market value of the fee is contrary to the proper 
administration of justice. She hired her attorneys to present that 
expert witness and for the appeal to this court and those attorneys 
have briefed and argued this point to the full extent permitted by 
law. This court has specifically decided this point against them 
and Mary Lehmer and she must be bound by that decision. 
She claims again too, for example, that there was no attorney-
client relationship between herself and Floyd Webster. She argues 
that in connection with the affidavit to terminate joint tenancy 
that, "I put a charge of $25 down for preparing and recording it. 
I in no way considered that this made me his attorney that day or 
retroactively. Completing such pre-printed forms is something 
non-lawyer realtors do every day.11 (Petition for Rehearing 12). 
But this is impermissible personal testimony in this court. Mary 
Lehmer has had her day to testify in court and she has utilized it. 
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The trial judge has found against her. There is nothing presented 
by her to warrant the alteration of this court's opinion that/ "A 
$25 attorney fee for drafting the affidavit was listed in Lehmerfs 
records concerning Webster's property and was among the total fees 
the trial court found Lehmer had paid in consideration for the 
termination of Websterfs life estate." Moreover, even if there had 
not been an attorney-client relationship in the entire transaction 
with Floyd Webster there surely was a confidential relationship 
between the parties as defined in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d at 
769 (Utah 1985), in view of the "long established relationship of 
trust" that existed here under all the facts and circumstances found 
below and recited by this court in its detailed decision including 
the previous legal advice given by Mary Lehmer to Floyd Webster and 
his wife. 
Another example of the rehashing of what has been previously 
argued exhaustively is Mary Lehmer!s claim that Floyd Webster 
ratified the contract ten (10) times over four (4) months. 
(Petition for Rehearing 7-8). The argument then, as before, totally 
misses the point. Floyd Webster consented to an unfair contract 
because of Ms. Lehmerfs abuse of a confidential relationship and 
for the other equally valid reasons for setting aside the contract 
found by the trial court. She has not met her burden of showing 
that it was a iair contract. Whether he "ratified" it one or ten 
or more times before he became aware of its unfairness makes no 
difference whatsoever. Ms. Lehmer presented to the trial court 
8 
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no action taken by the Lehmers to their detriment that might 
constitute an estoppel. (Findings #12). 
CONCLUSION 
We do not again address all of the points raised by Ms. Lehmer 
because we have already done so in our brief to this court. If 
it be necessary for this court to refresh its recollection, we 
urge that plaintifffs original brief be reread. We regret that the 
events may have damaged Mary Lehmerfs reputation. We regret too 
that she entered into this transaction, that she did not rescind it 
in February of 1981 or abide by the judgment of the trial court and 
that Floyd Webster has had to wait six and one half years to have the 
matter finally resolved. We submit that the Petition for Rehearing 
should be quietly denied. 
Dated: August 13, 1987 
IS J. SMEDLEY * ^C^rccic 
(xt(>rney for Appellee ^J 
Floyd Webster 
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APPENDIX 
JAMES J . SMEDLEY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3Q NORTH MAIN STREET. SUITE 5 
HEBER CITY, UTAH 8 4 0 3 2 
TKLKPHQNE 6 5 4 - 1 0 3 1 
February 24, 19 81 
Mr. and Mrs. Charles R. Lehmer 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Lehmer: 
Floyd Webster has retained me for the purpose of requesting 
permission to rescind a purported sales agreement of October 7, 
1980, and December 21, 1980. He is rather depressed about this 
matter and feels that he has sold far below the market value due 
to his financial circumstances and the depression that he was under 
in October of 1980. He has other items of concern, but primarily 
the above sets out his feelings. 
With this in mind, I am tendering to you the sum of $1256.20. This 
covers the $356.20 paid to Park City and the $900.00 which has been 
paid to him from time to time. I assume that you have some additional 
out-of-pocket expenses for which he is willing to reimburse you. 
It would be appreciated if you would look with favor upon him being 
allowed to make restitution. 
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please let me 
know. 
Sirtc 
DLEY 
JJS:jt 
Encl. 
cc: Floyd Webster 
c/o Fred H. JNyman 
95 North 300 West 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
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